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Roberts: Socio-Religious Obstacles to Judicial Reconstruction in Post-Sadd

NOTE
SOCIO-RELIGIOUS OBSTACLES TO JUDICIAL
RECONSTRUCTION IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ
There can be no free society without law administered through an
independentjudiciary.If one man can be allowed to determinefor himself
what is law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyrrany. Legal
process is an essentialpart of the democraticprocess.

INTRODUCTION

Given Iraq's location and position of relative influence in the
Middle East, 2 it is of the utmost importance that the power vacuum that
was created by the coalition invasion is filled with an orderly system of
governance, one that the Iraqi people, the rest of the Middle East and the
world at large can look to as a model for the reestablishment of
democracy in a post-conflict setting.3 The only way the reconstruction
process can be successful in the long-term will be to establish a
functioning judiciary that will be viewed as legitimate by the Iraqi
people. In order to achieve this legitimacy, this system must take into
account and provide representation to the myriad religious, ethnic, and
1. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 312 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
2. See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, Editorial, Buy One Get One Free, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2003, at A9 (providing an editorial analysis of the diplomatic, political, and military importance of
Iraq's physical location in relation to neighboring Iran); Sen. John McCain, Editorial, Why We Must
Win, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2003, at B7. Senator McCain had this to say on the potential
importance of the American occupation of Iraq vis-A-vis the Middle East in general:
Iraq's transformation into a progressive Arab state could set the region.., on a new
course in which democratic expression and economic prosperity, rather than a
radicalizing mix of humiliation, poverty, and repression, define a modernity in the
Muslim world that does not express itself in ways that threaten its people or other
nations.
Id
3. The ABA has published an informative account of their experience working towards this
same goal in post-conflict Afghanistan. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, FILLING
THE VACUUM: PREREQUISITES TO SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN, (Report of the Consortium for

Response to the Afghanistan Transition, Washington D.C.), Mar. 2002 (hereinafter CRAFT REPORT).
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social groups within Iraq. As a prelude to proposing some means by
which this goal might be achieved, this Note will analyze some of the
various cultural and legal factors that will come to bear on this process.
The discord between the Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims will be considered
in terms of how these cultural trends may affect the process of restaffing the nation's courts, with specific attention to the potential effects
of the de-Baathification process.
Amidst the initial talk of how this reconstruction effort was to
proceed, the two primary goals of the interim administration were the
creation of a Constitution,4 to be followed by elections. A U.N.
resolution gave the Interim Government until December 15, 2003 to
draft a charter timetable for these events. 5 As of early December 2003,
there was still a great deal of dispute over this timetable, as well as the
method for establishing an interim government in the form of a
"Transitional National Assembly.",6 Nearly one year later, elections are
now tentatively planned for January of 2005, while an increasingly
organized insurgency seems poised to disrupt the electoral process.7 The
reestablishment of a functioning judiciary is a crucial co-requisite to
each of these stages in the reconstruction process. 8 Needless to say, there
is also a great deal of talk about establishing basic security in Iraq. Given
that the situation is still so volatile that even some of the judges who
remain are being targeted for assassination, 9 it seems as if the process of

4. In September of 2003, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell described the timeframe within
which the U.S. had hoped that Iraqis would have written a new Constitution at some time before
April of 2004. Steven Weisman, Powell Gives Iraq 6 Months to Write a Constitution, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2003, at Al.
5. Felicity Barringer, Unanimous Vote by U.N. 's Council Adopts Iraq Plan; Interim
Government Has 2 Months to Drafta CharterTimetable, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at Al.
6. Archie Tse, In Dispute: The Caucus Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at A 11(providing a
helpful diagram and textual explanation of the proposed U.S. plan for "caucus-style elections" to
facilitate the transfer of power to the Iraqi people).
7. Larry Kaplow, U.S. Sees Upsurge in Iraqi Violence, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
Oct. 11, 2004, at Al.
8. In fact, it seems the Bush Administration was aware of this as well, in that they were
preparing legal teams months before the invasion. See, e.g., PAUL M. LALONDE, FROM HAMMURABI
To GEORGE W.: THE OPERATIONAL, LEGAL AND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT OF POST-SADDAM IRAQ

8 (Sept. 15, 2003) (prepared as notes for a presentation at the Annual Meeting of the International
Bar Association) ("Since July 2002, the Iraqi Jurists' Association has been in consultation with the
State Department on its 'Future of Iraq' project."). See also JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., AMERICA'S
ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING: FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ 171 (2003) (recognizing that "deep
structural reform of the legal... system[ ]" will be crucial to fulfilling Iraq's economic potential).
9. Phillip Coorey, Saddam Behind Attack on HQ in Baghdad: Bush, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(Sydney, Australia), Nov. 6, 2003, at 35 ("In Mosul, Iraq's third-largest city, gunmen killed a judge
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establishing basic security must be carried on simultaneously with the
reestablishment of a functioning judiciary. However, Iraq will not be
able to establish security and basic law and order without some sort of
criminal judicial process. A visit to the website for the Coalition
Provisional Authority in December of 2003 revealed that the official
word on this topic was as follows: "Iraq's judicial system is functional,
with criminals being tried in Iraqi courts by independent Iraqi judges.
Senior Baathist and corrupt judges have been removed from their
positions.'" A visit to the updated version of this website a year later
reveals much of the same verbiage, although preceded with the
admission that "much work needs to be done."" The few press releases
that tend to illustrate that the judiciary is in fact operational 2 must be
considered in light of the rampant crime and violence that come through
the mainstream media's portrayal of the current situation in Iraq. More
recently, Iraq's special criminal court, established by the Coalition
Provisional Authority, brought charges against a member of the Iraqi
National Congress under a law promulgated under the Baathists that
forbade any contact with an enemy state. The politician's crime was to
attend an antiterrorism conference in Israel, at which he publicly
suggested that Iraq and Israel open diplomatic ties. 13 Thus it appears as if
the newly established judiciary may already be subject to the influences
of the recently deposed Baathist regime. Needless to say, a great deal of
work does in fact remain to be done.

near his home. Ismail Youssef, a Christian, was the second Iraqi judge assassinated in as many
days.").
10. Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq), at http://www.cpa.gov/security/justice.html (last
visited Jan. 25, 2004).
11. Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq), at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/security/
JudicialSystem.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2004) ("While much work needs to be done, Iraq's
judicial system is functional, with criminals being tried in Iraqi courts by independent Iraqi judges.
Senior Baathist and corrupt judges have been removed from their positions.").
12. The CPA periodically puts out press releases about recent convictions handed down by
the Central Criminal Court. See, e.g., Press Release, Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq), Iraq's
Central Criminal Court Convicts

Two

Oil

Smugglers (Oct.

13,

2003),

available at

http://www.iraqcoalition.org/pressreleases/20031014_OCT- 14-Conviction.htm. These press releases
are infrequent. One can hope that there are convictions being handed down that are simply not
reported by the CPA.
13. Erik Eckholm, Iraqi Indictedfor Proposalto Open Talks With Israel,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2004, at A5. The man charged has claimed that former Baathists within the Iraqi intelligence
network are behind the indictment. Id.
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Part I of the Note will work to clarify what "the Law" has come to
mean for Iraq as a nation given the influences of the shari'a,14 Islam
generally, Ottoman Rule, the English Mandate, and eventually Saddam's
regime. Part II will address some of the key cultural factors that will
come to bear on the process of judicial reform in post-conflict Iraq, as
well as some of the recent events, such as the Coalition invasion itself,
that will have a great impact on the nature of those same efforts towards
judicial reform.' 5 Part III will examine those cultural and logistical
obstacles that the author believes will be the most complex as the
judicial reform process continues over the coming years, with specific
attention paid to the selection process for judges, as well as the issue of
what sort of training mechanisms might be employed and/or established
to support the nascent judiciary. This portion of the Note will also
highlight some lessons learned in previous nation-building efforts that
16
might prove helpful as this process advances.
Aside from concerns over an anti-American backlash,17 the real
threat of a failed effort in this arena is that such a failure could have
14. "Shari'a" can be roughly defined as "[lt]he code of law based on the Koran." AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). However, "the Shari'a is best

understood as a shared opinion of the community, based on literature that is extensive, but not
necessarily coherent or authorized by any single body." Knut S. Vikor, The Shari'a and the Nation
State: Who Can Codify the Divine Law?, in THE MIDDLE EAST IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: PAPERS
FROM THE FOURTH NORDIC CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, OSLO 1998, at 220, 221

(Knut. S. Vikor & Bjorn Olav Utvik eds., 2000). For a thorough, but slightly dated, analysis of the
development of early Islamic jurisprudence, see NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW

(1964).
15. In terms of physical infrastructure, 75% of Iraq's courts were damaged or destroyed in the
war and subsequent looting. US-Led Coalition Launches Sweeping Judicial Reforms in Iraq,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 18, 2003. Similar destruction, caused by the Taliban, has severely
impeded progress towards judicial reform in Afghanistan. CRAFT REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.
16. It may help the reader to know what this Note will not address. Whether this
reconstruction process succeeds in establishing a stable democracy remains to be seen, and we all
must bear in mind that such changes do not take place overnight. Recall that it took fifteen years for
democracy to take hold in West Germany following WWII. See Diethelm Prowe, Foundations of
West German Democracy: Corporatist Patterns in the Post-1945 Democratization Process, in
COPING WITH THE PAST: GERMANY AND AUSTRIA AFTER 1945, at 105 (Kathy Harms et. al. eds.,

1990). That said, this Note will not address a prospective timeframe during which these issues might
be addressed. The process through which a new Iraqi Constitution will be drafted is similarly
beyond the scope of this Note. While the establishment of basic criminal justice mechanisms will be
referred to, the debate over war-crimes tribunals and other such matters will not be covered. This
Note is designed to illuminate the medium- to long-term obstacles that the new Iraqi judiciary and
its architects will face.
17. There is already a great deal of anti-American sentiment in Iraq and within the Muslim
world as a whole. See Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World, Panel
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2003, at Al (discussing the United States government's efforts to
counteract America's "plummeting public image among Muslims and Arabs abroad").
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absolutely devastating effects on the Iraqi people themselves, as well as
the future political make-up of the Middle East and the rest of the World.
That said, it matters little what one perceives as either the immediate or
long-term goals of this judicial reconstruction process. In order for any
sort of economic, political, or social growth to arise from this new Iraqi
government, it must be established in such a way that Iraq will not be a
breeding ground for either fundamentalist Islamic movements or a
similarly repressive regime such as that which existed under Saddam
Hussein. In the words of President George W. Bush, "The failure of
Iraqi democracy would embolden terrorists around the world.., and
extinguish the hopes of millions in the region ....Iraqi democracy will
succeed and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to
Tehran, that freedom can be the future of every nation. 18 Political
rhetoric aside, members of the global legal community must be aware of
how much of a role the legal profession should play in the reconstruction
process.
Drawing a distinction between mere "knowledge" and "wisdom,"
derived from life experience, one commentator on the present state of
the Iraqi legal system stated that "[o]ne benefit of wisdom is its value in
sorting through knowledge and ideas to discern what is right and judge
what is true." 19 This same commentator goes on to state simply that,
"wisdom is in short supply [and] [g]iven the formation of a more benign
state in Iraq, the years ahead will show whether the wisdom its people
20
have accumulated will translate into effective reforms in ...[the] law.,
An Iranian-trained attorney who left Tehran in 1974, Shalah Hodjat
Samsami, echoed this sentiment. In a discussion with the author, she
stressed that there was one word that ought to be kept closely in mind
throughout this reconstruction process. The word is "wisdom. 2 1 She
went on to explain that "whoever guides the judicial reform process
needs to use wisdom in doing this, and must not be arrogant or ignorant
of the specifics of the region. 2 This Note is designed to form some
basis for this ultimately necessary wisdom.

18.

President George W. Bush, Address to National Endowment for Democracy (Nov. 7,

2003) (quoted in David E. Sanger, Bush Asks Lands in Mideast to Try Democractic Ways, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003, at Al).
19. JOSEPH BRAUDE, THE NEW IRAQ 166 (2003).

20. Id.
21. Telephone Interview with Dr. Shahla Hodjat Samsami (Nov. 15, 2003).
22.

Id.
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WHAT IS THE LAW OF THE LAND IN IRAQ?

This section addresses the history of the Iraqi nation-state leading
up to the point at which the Baath party took power, 13 with a specific
focus on those historical events and trends that will come to bear most
directly on the project of rebuilding a functioning judiciary.24 It will also
address the state of Iraq's modem judiciary under the Baath party just
prior to the Coalition invasion. The end result of the historical details
below will be familiar to many readers of this note given that tales of
Saddam Hussein's brutality as a political leader are well-documented.
However, Hussein's direct influence on Iraq's legal system must not be
considered in a historical vacuum. One of the final issues of a Baath
party-sponsored legal journal displayed the words of Saddam Hussein on
the front page: "Justice is above the law.",25 While Mr. Hussein's
individual role in creating this appalling misconception of how justice
ought to be administered cannot be overlooked, there were centuries of
history that came before him.
A.

Early Development of the Iraqi State

In order to understand what the law consists of in Iraq, it is
necessary to have some understanding of the historical trends that
shaped the current state of Iraq as it developed over the years. Present
day Iraq began as a loosely configured group of city-states centered
around the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.26 The country's name is derived
from the term al-'Iraq,which means "the shore of a great river along its
length, as well as the grazing land surrounding it."'27 The three cities of
Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul were provinces under Ottoman rule
beginning around the sixteenth century.2 8 The mamluk warrior class that
ruled these provinces under the watchful eye of the Pasha in Istanbul
was predominantly composed of Arabs and Shi'ite Muslims, yet their
ruling class was primarily Sunni Muslim, a trend that would continue
23. The influence of Saddam Hussein and his Baath party on Iraq's judicial system will be
addressed in Part III infra.
24. The author relied heavily on the second edition of A History oflraq by Dr. Charles Tripp
in creating this selective history of Iraq. See generally CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ (2d ed.
2002). For those interested in a more thorough analysis, Dr. Tripp's work is an excellent starting
point given its relative objectivity and the degree of detail found therein.
25.

BRAUDE, supranote 19, at 168.

26. See TRIPP, supra note 24, at 8.
27. Id.
28. See id.
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throughout Iraq's development. 29 Growing concern with the
development of European political and military might during the
nineteenth century led the Ottomans to oust the mamluks and reassert
30
direct control over the three provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul.
In so doing, the Ottomans provided the region's first exposure to the
"European Model" of government. 3 1 One of the most influential reforms
during this time was the Land Law of 1858, which effectively conceded
a degree of tenured ownership to landholders, while also reestablishing
state ownership of land.3 2 This changed the traditional dynamic of the
predominantly tribal social groups in such a way that the more
influential tribal leaders began to see the state as something that might
be relied on to bring order to their leaseholds: "[E]ven in this [tribal
agrarian] sector of society, traditionally wary of the state and disdainful
of engagement with it, there was a growing number for whom the
advantages of participation [with the state] in some effective form began
to outweigh the advantages of keeping their distance. 33 This was the
first inkling of representative government to come to this broad swath of
land that encompassed the lands of ancient Mesopotamia.
As these reforms and the move to the "European model" slowly
took hold, a degree of disenchantment with Ottoman rule developed
along with an increased degree of participation with the state and its
institutions.34 This resulted in a young educated class, "the Young
Turks," many of whom left the Mesopotamian provinces to attend
Istanbul's Law School. 35 The Young Turk revolution in 1908 saw the
reinstatement of the Ottoman Constitution and the public establishment
of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), both of which breathed
life into the developing state's sense of political self-awareness. 36 The
formation of the CUP as a semi-autonomous political unit was to have a
tremendous impact on the future course of Iraq's development at the
outbreak of the First World War. The CUP had aligned itself with
Germany and was developing a contentious relationship with Russia.37
These factors were among those that the Ottomans considered in their
29. See id. at12-13.
30. See id.at 14.
31.

Id.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See id.at 15.
Id. at 17.
Id.at 20-2 1.
See id.
See id. at 22-23.
See id.at 28.
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eventual alliance with the Central Powers in October of 1914. In
November of that year, the British occupation of Basra
marked the
38
beginning of the end of Ottoman control of the region.
B. ImperialDominance
Following the invasion and occupation of Basra, Baghdad, and
Mosul by the British, the three provinces were consolidated under a
League of Nations Mandate through which the British were to rule the
area until 1932. 39 The goal of the British Mandate has been described as
"the establishment of a recognizable state and the development of a
social order appropriate to it. ' 4° The British found that trends of
"hierarchical and authoritarian" rule that had taken hold under the
Ottomans were an obstacle to their nationalist goals.41 In an effort to
counteract these trends, the British looked to two groups within Iraq in
an effort to achieve these goals.42 These two groups consisted of
predominantly Sunni members of the former Ottoman administrative
engine, "for whom the new state of Iraq was the guarantee of their
centrality and status," and the elite landholding members of society,
"whose value lay in their dependence on a state which provided them
with the means of ensuring social order. 4 3 Shi'ites, who made up more
than half of Iraq's population, and the Kurds, who made up
approximately twenty percent of the population, were almost completely
excluded from roles of authority under the Mandate.44 Despite the fact
that Sunni Arabs made up less than twenty percent of the population,
their ranks dominated the various government ministries as well as the
officer corps of the armed forces.45
Following the dissolution of much of the Ottoman administrative
apparatus, the British introduced the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes
Regulation (codified into Iraqi law in 1924) which granted tribal leaders
Wieti
the authority to hear disputes among their constituents. 46 While
this
38. See id. at 29.
39. See id. at 30.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 31.

43. Id. at 31. See discussion supranote 33 and accompanying text.
44.

See id at 31.

45. See id.
46. Id. at 37. A similar technique was employed years later by Saddam Hussein. However, his
apparent goal was to fracture the broader tribal community in hopes of reducing organized political
opposition. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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authority to hear disputes was not a departure from the system as it
existed prior to the British, the Regulation also empowered the tribal
sheikhs to collect taxes on behalf of the occupying British, thereby
establishing a form of indirect, but powerful, rule over Iraq's tribal
communities.47 This new means of affecting some degree of control over
the tribal population spawned the growth of anti-British sentiment
among this same population whose entire habit of living had existed
almost completely independently of centralized authority until this point.
This growing degree of dissatisfaction came to a head when an
armed revolt broke out in June of 1920.48 This revolt was born in the

Shi'ite religious centers of Karbala and Najaf, but eventually spread to
include the Kurdish areas in the North, as well as the tribally-dominated
Shi'ite areas around Baghdad itself.49 While the revolt was eventually

put down by superior British firepower, its occurrence created several
currents in Iraqi government which were to have long-lasting effects.

The revolt was one of the first, if not only times, that Sunni and Shi'ite
Arabs collaborated against a common foe. Of the 6,000 Iraqis to have
been killed during the revolt, most were Shi'ite given the geographical
origins of the revolt. Much of the Sunni elite, who were to benefit from
the political opportunities created by the revolt, were also concerned as it
raged because it represented a growth in tribal and Shi'ite power which
affect their own privileged position in Iraq's
could directly
50
government.

In an effort to discover what form of government would achieve the
goals of the Mandate, the British reestablished much of the Ottoman
administrative apparatus after the revolt, placing almost exclusively
Sunnis into important ministerial and administrative roles.5 ' While the
Sunnis certainly dominated the higher positions atop the various
Ministries, including the Ministry of Justice, the Sunni-dominated
atmosphere extended to include not only judges, but clerks and bailiffs
as well.52 Given that the Shi'ites had been largely excluded from
administrative positions under Ottoman rule, there were precious few
with any experience in the governmental arena.53 For the Shi'ites whose
blood had fueled the revolt of 1920, the continuation of a Sunni47. Id. at 37.
48. See id. at 43.
49. See id.

50. See id
51
52.

See id.
See id.

53.

See id.
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dominated atmosphere in the government "left a legacy of resentment
against the emerging political establishment in Baghdad which few
members of that establishment saw fit to address and which was to have
troubling consequences for the politics of the new state. 54
The British sought to elude Iraqi concern over the notion of a
Mandate by structuring their relationship in the form of a treaty, whose
formation coincided with the ongoing debate over the Constitutional
framework of the new state. 55 Debate over the latter had traditionally
attracted the attention and energy of the Shi'ite religious leaders, or
mujtahids, given their inclinations to preserve Iraq as an Islamic State. 6
The ratification of the aforementioned treaty again drew the ire of the
mujtahids as well as that of the lay Shi'ites.57 However, "[t]he powerful
seduction of the state, with its positions, patronage and resources was
beginning to exert its force on the tribal shaikhs. 5 8 This influence began
to create a divide between the mujtahids and the lay Shi'ites which
marked the beginning of the decline of religious influence in the pattern
of Iraqi government. 9 It was during this period that Shi'ite issues
relevant to the system of government were increasingly addressed by lay
people. This resulted in the mujtahid'sretreat from the realm of political
matters, leaving them to opine on matters of "Islamic jurisprudence and
moral exhortation," both of which were to have an increasingly less
significant role in Iraqi government as the years progressed. 60 Another
major factor that contributed to the development of Iraq as a
predominantly secular state, in terms of both its national identity and
judicial structure, was that Sunni Islam, unlike the Shi'ite tradition, does
not mandate that its followers adhere to the rulings (fatwa) handed down
by their religious leaders (ulama).61 This "well-established fact" further
marginalized the Shi'ite majority in that the highest authority under
which their actions were to be considered was fundamentally different

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 45.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 52-55.
See id.

58.

Id. at 56.

59. See id. at 57.
60. Id.
61. Peter Heine, Zghurt and Shmurt: Aspects of the Traditional Shi'i Society, in
AYATOLLAHS, SUFIS, AND IDEOLOGUES; STATE, RELIGION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN IRAQ 36,
37 (Faleh Abdul-Jabar ed., 2002).
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from the authority to which the Sunni looked for guidance in the law,
namely the State.62
Once the Iraqi Constitution, whose composition had fueled so much
debate, was adopted, the disparate treatment of Sunnis and Shi'ites was
essentially codified. Article 16 of this document divided Iraqis into
"original" and "non-original" Iraqis, the former being those who enjoyed
citizenship under the Ottomans.63 Article 6, that which had previously
declared the legal equality of all Iraqis, was amended to read, "Iraqis are
equal in enjoying their civil and political rights and fulfilling their civic
duties and tasks. Only original Iraqis are entrusted with public jobs
according to their ability and qualification without discrimination, except
for cases specified by law."64 The Iraqi Nationality Law, enacted on
October 9, 1924, established a similar division amongst the Iraqi
populace.65 If one was not an Ottoman Citizen, then the only remaining
category was those who were declared to be "of formerly Persian
'dependency.' 6 6 This was true regardless of one's actual birthplace and
the categorization "would apply to their sons, grandsons and greatgrandsons in perpetuity., 67 These laws remained in force until the end of
Saddam Hussein's regime. 68 While neither of these laws still exists
today, their effect on the judiciary, and the rest of the nation's
governmental apparatus, can not be overlooked.
In summary, the period of the British Mandate in Iraq saw many of
the same trends that marginalized the nation's Shi'ite and Kurd
population during the time of the Ottomans; "Britain also
institutionalized anti-Shi'ism when building up the nascent Iraqi state by
installing a Sunni monarch with a government and bureaucracy that was
virtually a Sunni preserve., 69 Given the existence of the deBaathification policy in Iraq today, it is unlikely that any future
government will retain this characteristic of being a "Sunni preserve."
However, we must nevertheless be mindful of the terribly detrimental

62. Id.
63. Ali Babakhan, The Deportation of the Shi 'is During the Iran-Iraq War, in AYATOLLAHS,
SUFIS, AND IDEOLOGUES; STATE, RELIGION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN IRAQ 183, 189 (Faleh
Abdul-Jabar ed., 2002).
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id
69. Id.at 186.
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effects that such factors have had on the Iraqi populace and their ability
to support a functioning judiciary.
C. The Periodof Independence
While British influence certainly continued, Iraq became the first of
the League of Nations Mandates to be admitted into the League of
Nations as a sovereign in October of 1932.70 One of the major concerns
amongst the League's assembly that was addressed prior to the vote was
the need for some sort of formal declaration that the sovereign Iraqi state
would respect fundamental human rights, with regard to both foreigners
within their borders and Iraq's existing Kurdish and Christian Assyrian
communities, both of whom were greatly concerned that a sovereign
Iraqi state run by predominantly Sunni Muslims would result in their
being further subjugated.7' It is interesting to note that these concerns on
the eve of independence from the British Mandate are very similar, if not
identical to the concerns that have created such discord amongst the
nascent Iraqi polity in the wake of the ouster of Saddam Hussein at the
hands of the Coalition of the Willing. Iraqi state politics were
"increasingly secular in nature" during this new period of independence,
due in no small part to an overwhelming drive to strengthen the Iraqi
state as such in order to maintain the systems of patronage and landownership that had come to define the basis of power for Iraq's ruling
elite. 72 During this time, the conflict raged on between the Sunni and
Shi'ite populations vis-A-vis their position in the government. As the
new state government was forming under the guidance of King Faisal,
the former leader of the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans,73 the trend of
Sunni elitism continued. The British were considering another man for
the job, Shaykh Khaz'al of the Muhammara, a Shi'ite. 74 The British
High Commissioner is said to have explained that Shaykh Khaz'al was
"dismissed as a candidate for the Iraqi throne because the installation of
a Shi'i king would not have been well received by the more powerful

70. See TRIPP, supranote 24, at 74-76.
71.

See id.

72.

Id.
at 77.

73.

See generally T.E. LAWRENCE, SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM (Wordsworth Classics 1997)

(1942) (autobiographical account of the Arab Revolt as experienced by British Lieutenant T.E.
Lawrence, popularly known as "Lawrence of Arabia"); LAWRENCE OF ARABIA (Columbia Pictures
1962) (cinematic interpretation of Lawrence's Seven Pillarsof Wisdom).
74. See Ali Babakhan, The Deportationof the Shi 'is During the Iran-Iraq War, supra note 63,
at 186.
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Sunnis."' 5 The man chosen for the position, King Faisal, "was sensitive
to this, but had no intention of overturning a system of patronage that
privileged his own position as well as that of the almost exclusively
Sunni Arab ex-Sharifian officers. 76
Following a decline in King Faisal's health, he was replaced in
1933 by his son, Ghazi, who has been described as "the product of a
system which exacerbated Shi'i resentment of the Sunni-dominated state
during the next few years."" King Ghaza was to play a very small role

in how the country was to develop. It was under his rule that regime
changes originating from schisms within the government and the
military were to become the norm.78
In March of 1935, a group of Shi'ite tribal sheikhs and mutahids
met to discuss their grievances and subsequently presented Mithaq alSha 'b, or "The People's Charter," to the government.7 9 One of the main
focuses of this document was the lack of Shi'ite representation in the
judiciary. 80 A period of unrest followed the presentation of the Mithaq
al-Sha 'b, during which time violence broke out in the Kurdish north as
well as the predominantly Shi'ite portions of southern and central Iraq.
A coup d'etat in the Fall of 1936 established Hikmat Sulaiman as the
prime minister and de facto leader of the Iraqi state. 81 He was
subsequently ousted by a military coup which was to have lasting effects
on the way in which Iraq was governed. Following Sulaiman's
resignation in August of 1937, the seven senior military officials who
worked towards his removal "introduced an era in Iraqi politics during
which civilian politicians held office only with the consent of these
82
men."
This trend has continued and is a major factor to be considered as
the judiciary, and the rest of the government, is rebuilt. For centuries,
Iraq has been a country wherein those who worked in support of the
government, such as members of the judiciary, could only do so with the
prior approval of the ruling elite. This approval could only be gained by
assuring this same elite that one would further their goals, no matter how

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
See TRIPP, supranote 24, at 79.
Id. at 82.
See generally id. at 82-107.
Id. at 82.

80.

See id

81.
82.

See id at 87-90.
Id. at 94.
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contrary they may be to the needs of the country or the theoretical goal
of democracy.
D. Under the Baath Party
This section will address Iraq's legal system as it existed under the
Baath party. Despite a relatively well-organized legal infrastructure, the
administration of justice under the Baath party was anything but just.
Iraq's first "modem" judicial system following the fall of the Ottoman
empire was created and staffed under the British Mandate.83 Until the
coup that gave the Baath party power, the judiciary was successful in
acting independently of, and sometimes in direct contravention to, the
executive branch.84 After the Baath party came to power in 1968, a new
constitution was established that effectively eliminated the separation of
powers and made the civil court system "subservient to the [newly
established] military court system. '85 In 1977, the Baathists stripped the
nation's highest court of the power to appoint judges and select their
own cases and bestowed this right upon the newly created Revolutionary
Command Council, at whose head sat Saddam Hussein. 86 One
commentator summarized the effect of the Baath party on Iraq's legal
system as follows: "During the Baathist era, whatever remained of the
rule of law in Iraq-as passed down from Hammurabi, Islamic
jurisprudence and British influence during the Hashemite monarchydisappeared in favour of courts subject to the will of an authoritarian
government., 87 In addition to establishing "special courts" to carry out
the whims of his regime, 8 Saddam Hussein's Baath party made a
"deliberate decision.., to encourage a return to tribal justice as part of
its policy of re-tribalizing Iraq to fragment political opposition." 89 This
had the effect of minimizing contact between the judicial apparatus and
a great extent of the nation's population that lived outside of urban
areas. 90 Despite the fact that the ability of the judiciary to operate
independently of the Baath party's often capricious whims was severely

83. UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT 104, ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF
LAW INIRAQ 5 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr104.pdf.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86.

BRAUDE, supra note 19, at 174.

87. LALONDE, supra note 8, at 8.
88. See infra notes 88-108 and accompanying text.
89. DOBBINS, supra note 8, at 178.
90. Id.
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impaired, there was a very firm judicial infrastructure whose topography
will likely translate into the country's post-Saddam judiciary.
In terms of substantive law, Iraq's civil and criminal systems relied
upon precedent set under the Ottoman canon from the nineteenth
century, as well as British law that was applied under the Mandate. 9'
Issues of personal status were handled by religious courts divided such
that the Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims might have their grievances heard
and disposed of according to their own traditional beliefs. A third
personal status court system, or "spiritual council," was established for
Christians and Jews.9 2 In 1951, an Egyptian jurist authored a national
code for Iraq that sought to account for and unify these "concentric legal
codes., 93 This code also established the three-tiered court structure that
exists to this day, although the degree to which it is functional is up for
debate. The author of the 1951 Civil Code had performed similar duties
for Libya, Egypt, and Syria in the past but considered the Iraqi code to
be his "masterpiece. 9 4
It is also important to note that Iraq uses a civil law system, rather
than the common law system used in the United States.9 5 This is
especially relevant given the differences between the role of a judge in
the civil system versus the role of a judge in the common law system. In
the former, "judges apply a comprehensive legal code to resolve issues
presented in the case, and they take an active role in making a
determination of a person's guilt or innocence. ,,96 Iraq, along with much
of the Middle East, operates with a criminal investigative structure
known as the niyaba system, wherein the judiciary fulfills the roles of
both investigator and prosecutor. 97 Under this system, prosecutors
"direct the court's attention to the facts in each case and advise the court
on the law." 98 Ultimately, the prosecutor may argue for acquittal as well
as conviction depending on the prosecutor's perception of the facts. 99
91. BRAUDE, supranote 19, at 174.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Frank J. McGovern, Rebuilding a Shattered System: American Lawyers are
Helping to Restore andReshape the Legal Structure ofIraq, 25 PENN. LAW. 34, 38 (2003).
96. Id.
97.

See id. at 38; see also NATHAN J. BROWN, ARAB JUDICIAL STRUCTURES 6 (2001)

(presented to the United Nations Development Programme on Governance in the Arab Region in
August of 2001) (chart listing systems of prosecution employed throughout much of the Middle
East).
98. See McGovern, supra note 95, at 38.
99. See id.
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Iraq's court system can be considered as an amalgamation of two
independent judicial organs: "The first is composed of the judicial
hierarchy that is supervised by the Ministry of Justice, and the second is
composed of a number of courts and tribunals affiliated to, and
100
supervised by, executive organs other than the Ministry of Justice."
The judiciary under the Minister of Justice was set up with somewhat
specialized courts of first instance arranged to hear different types of
disputes, an intermediate appellate level consisting of regional appellate
courts, and a Supreme Court of sorts. Iraq's Highest Court, the Court of
Cassation (Mahkamat al-Tamyeez), has appellate jurisdiction over all of
the nation's civil and criminal courts.10' The Court of Cassation also
applying shari'a law to
heard appeals from the Religious Courts,
02
personal status issues among Muslims.1
The courts of first instance were divided into Criminal, Civil, and
Religious Courts.10 3 The Criminal Court of First Instance (Makhamat alJunah) heard cases arising from misdemeanors and felonies carrying a
penalty of five years of less.' 4 More serious felonies and appeals from
this court were heard at the Higher Criminal Court (Muhkamat alJinayat).10 5 Appeals from the decisions of this court would be heard in
the Court of Cassation.10 6 The Civil Court of First Instance (Makhamat
al-Bidaya) heard cases involving individuals and corporations that did
not fall under the purview of the Religious Courts that dealt mostly with
personal status issues (such as those dealing with family, marriage, and
inheritance) among Muslims.' 0 7 Appeals from the Civil Court of First
Instance arising from dispute between individuals and/or corporations
would be heard in one of eighteen Courts of Appeal arranged throughout
the country. 0 8 Decisions from this intermediate appellate level, as well

100. PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE IN THE ARAB REGION, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, IRAQ: JUDICIARY, at http://www.undp-pogar.org/countries/iraq/udiciary-pw.html
(last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 6.
103. SPECIAL REPORT 104, supranote 83, at 5-6.

104.

Id.

105.

Id

106. Id.
107. Non-Muslims with civil disputes would be heard in the Civil Court of First Instance. Id.
108. Id. There is conflicting information on the number of Courts of Appeal. The Special
Report from which this number (18) is drawn was released by the United States Institute of Peace, a
federal institution created by Congress. See http://www.usip.org for more information. Information
made available by the United Nations Development Programme-Programme on Governance in the
Arab Region (UNDP-POGAR) explains that there are seven judicial districts, each with their own
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as decisions from the Civil Court of First Instance that addressed
disputes with administrative bodies, would then be heard in the Court of
Cassation.10 9 Criminal proceedings that involved soldiers were heard by
the Military Courts (al-mahkama al-Khasa and al-mahkama alda'imiyah), which operate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Defense. "0
The most relevant aspect of Iraq's pre-war judiciary for purposes of
this analysis are those courts that do not fall under the guidance and
control of the Ministry of Justice, namely the Law Enforcement Courts
(Mahakem Qi'wa al-Amn al-Dakhili) and the Revolutionary and Special
Courts established by the Baath party following the military coup that
brought them to power on July 30, 1968.111 These courts "had the right
of first dibs to any case and a more reflexive disposition to rule
according to the whims of the political leadership." ' 12 The Law
Enforcement Courts were responsible for hearing cases that involved the
various security forces whose primary responsibility was to protect
against plots to overthrow the regime.' 1 3 These courts were independent
of the nation's Civil and Criminal court system and did not fall under the
jurisdiction of the Court of Cassation.114 This insulated the members of
these security forces from potential criticism and attack from the
nation's judiciary, effectively establishing a police state in which the
regime's security115apparatus was accountable to no one, save Saddam
Hussein himself.
The Revolutionary Courts were established to address matters of
national security as well as issues arising from corruption within the
regime.116 These courts were also completely independent of the regular
judiciary. They were typically staffed by high-ranking Baath party
members, many of whom did not have legal training of any kind." 7
They also "ha[d] the power to ignore habeus corpus and their decisions
Court of Appeal. See http://www.undp-pogar.org/countries/iraq/judiciary-pw.html
information on the UNDP-POGAR.
109. See id.
110. Seeid. at6.
111. See id. at 6; see also TRIPP, supra note 24, at 192.
112.

for more

BRAUDE, supra note 19, at 175.

113. SPECIAL REPORT 104, supra note 83, at 6. See also id. at 4-5 (analyzing the organizational
structure of the various security organizations).
114. See id. at 6.
115. See id. ("In practice, the Law Enforcement and Military Courts have protected their
constituents.").
116. Seeid.
117. See id.
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[we]re final and without appeal."' l 8 The overwhelming authority of
these courts and their ability to directly carry out the will of Saddam
Hussein severely impaired the functional worth of the regular judicial
system, and contributed to widespread corruption among the judiciary,
"which previously enjoyed a reputation for integrity."' 1 9
Two examples of the way in which this independent judicial wing
was used by the Baath party will prove helpful. In January of 1976,
Hussein had then-acting President Hasan al-Bakr promote him to the
rank of general. Simultaneously with this promotion, Hussein doubled
the size of the army, "effectively deterring any other faction in the
[Baath] party from challenging Saddam Husain's own leadership."' 12 He
also enlarged the number of members in the Regional Command Council
(RCC) in January of 1977, effectively "diluting the influence of those
who still had reservations about his ascendancy."' 12 ' In response to these
actions, and the general trend of marginalizing the Shi'ite majority that
had characterized the Baathist rule, a large scale demonstration
involving upwards of 30,000 people arose in and around the southern
cities of Najaf and Karbala. 22 Rioting broke out in the face of military
intervention and, in addition to a number of casualties, over 2,000 people
were arrested. 23 A special ad-hoc court was established to try the
demonstrators. This court sentenced eight of the Shi'ite religious leaders
(ulama) to death and imprisoned a number of others. The court also took
actions which resulted in the closing down of many of the Shi'ite study
circles, and the subsequent exodus of many religious scholars from the
country.' 24 Hussein thought that these sentences were "too lenient" and
promptly dismissed the man he had hand-picked to be president of this
cabinet ministers who had
special court, as well as one of the Shi'ite
125
RCC.
the
to
appointed
been
only recently
This episode illustrates that Hussein's leadership would not tolerate
any sort of popular uprising. Similarly, his creation of the special court
and subsequent dismissal of those in charge of it from governmental
service made clear that any judicial actions that did not meet with his
ideals of how such insurrections ought to be repressed would be equally
118.

Id.

119.

Id.

120.
121.
122.
123.

TRIPP, supra note 24, at 216.
Id.
See id.
See id.

124.

See id.

125. Id.
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unacceptable, thereby establishing a system in which even his specially
appointed judges could act only in the way that Hussein thought they
should, leaving no room for actual judicial decision-making.
In July of 1979, President Hasan al-Bakr announced his resignation
amidst rumors that he was considering nominating Hafiz al-Asad of
Syria to act as his successor. 126 However, Saddam Hussein had himself
sworn in within hours of al-Bakr's resignation. While it is unclear
whether al-Bakr had ever truly considered placing the Syrian Baathist alAsad into the office of president, 127 Hussein reacted based on the simple
fact that any possible alternative to his leadership was being
discussed. 128 Hussein convened a special convention of the RCC in late
July of 1979, in which he declared that his security forces had uncovered
a plot to overthrow the regime from within the RCC itself. 129 Following
the arrest of over sixty high-ranking members of the regime, a special
court was created to address this alleged plot.1 30 The court sentenced
many of those initial sixty arrestees to death, including five members of
the RCC. 13 ' The retribution that began with the actions of this special
court resulted in the execution of approximately five hundred senior
Baath party members, leaving others to be demoted or simply purged
from public office altogether.' 32 Here again, we see Hussein using the
judiciary as a tool to carry out his very specific will. This sort of
behavior had the dual effect of undermining the authority and
effectiveness of the judiciary to objectively address matters that came
before it, as well as an equally damaging effect upon the Iraqi people's
perception of the judiciary as a mere enforcement mechanism for a
ruthless and malevolent leader.
The level of corruption in Iraq's judiciary under the Baath party is
also of great concern and will need to be confronted head on as the
process of judicial reconstruction moves forward. Some have claimed
that "most judges [under the Baath party] earned more money accepting
bribes than meting out impartial justice."1 33 However, a group of Iraqi

126. See id.
at 222.
127. Some scholars point to the fact that al-Bakr emerged from this episode alive and unimprisoned as evidence that at least Hussein himself did not believe that it was al-Bakr's intention
to place someone else in the position of President. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id
132. See id.
133. BRAUDE, supra note 19, at 175.
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(and by definition former Baath party members) judges that were
interviewed by American military jurists in the Fall of 2003 claimed that
corruption "was not much of a problem."'134 Interestingly enough, the
Iraqi lawyers with whom these Americans spoke had a different story to
tell. They explained that corruption in the judiciary was a serious
problem, and cited the fact that "the judicial institute that all judges had
to attend provided no judicial training but rather a two-year
indoctrination into the Baath party.' ' 135 In addition to bribery, justice was
frequently delivered (or "not delivered" as the case may be) based upon
interpersonal relationships. 36 A female attorney that was interviewed by
this same group from the 358th Civil Affairs Brigade told stories of
lawyers, judges, and policemen gathering for a feast, at which "they
would work things out regardless of the law."' 137 She also claimed that,
in order to win a criminal case, she would have to have sex with the
police officer involved in the prosecution.' 38 In addition to the
aforementioned varieties of corruption, the Iraqi judiciary also suffered
based upon the influence of Hussein's special courts, whose "gavelhappy judges punished the accused and rewarded the well-connected
with the sort of swiftness Saddam liked best."' 139 The people's
conditioning to this level of state-sponsored corruption will likely pose a
great obstacle to the judicial reconstruction process, despite the absence
of formal Baath party leadership.
II.

CHANGES TO THE JUDICIARY SINCE THE COALITION INVASION

A.

Under the CoalitionProvisionalAuthority

The first action taken by the CPA towards the goal of judicial
reform was the establishment of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq on
July 11, 2003.140 This was a crucial step in that it was a necessary
precedent to the establishment of security in Iraq. Its structure may also
serve as a helpful guideline for establishing a model for the reformation

134. McGovern, supra note 95, at 35.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. BRAUDE, supra note 19, at 175.
140. The Central Criminal Court of Iraq, Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq), Ord. 13
(revised) (July 11, 2003),
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of the rest of Iraq's court system. 14 1 Iraq's Council of Judges was
reestablished in October 2003 after having been abolished by Hussein's
regime in 1979.142 The Council is designed to oversee the judicial
system and investigate alleged "professional misconduct and
incompetence.' 43 Perhaps most importantly, it exists and operates
independently of the Ministry of Justice, a feature that will help to
ensure some degree of judicial independence. 4
Given the current level of animosity towards the United States in
Iraq, it seems as if the United States should consider granting as much
lawmaking ability to the Iraqi people as possible, on as rapid a schedule
as is feasible. One Iraqi attorney (a Sunni) had this to say about the
United States' actions in Iraq: "They have destroyed our institutions, our
people and our security .... They have totally erased us.' 45 While this
attitude is not representative of the entire Iraqi population, it is relevant
as a cautionary note given that such venom was delivered by a member
of the Iraqi bar. It is important for all involved to know that the societal
issues that must be addressed and confronted do not exist simply in the
nation's rural areas, nor strictly among the vehemently religious.
1. The Perceived Threat of Equal Representation on the Bench
Iraq is home to numerous ethnic and socio-religious sub-groups, all
of whom are hopeful that the new government will grant them the
fundamental rights and respect that they were deprived of under Saddam
Hussein, as well as many of his predecessors. The area of Northern Iraq
that abuts Turkey and Iran is populated by an ethnic sub-group of
Kurdish peoples, whose ethnic lineage is traced to the area in and around
contemporary Kurdistan, rather than to the Arab peoples who inhabited
al-Iraqprior to the establishment of Ottoman rule in the area.' 46 As such,
the Kurds have long been clamoring for some degree of political
independence and in some cases, complete autonomy. In fact, this drive
for Kurdish autonomy is one of major points of debate over the drafting

141.
142.
4, 2003),
143.
144.

See LALONDE, supra note 8, at 8.
Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq), Council of Judges Begins Work Again in Iraq(Oct.
available at http://www.cpa.gov/pressreleases/20031007_Oct-04-CouncilofJudges.html.
Id.
Id.

145. Edmund L. Andrews & Patrick E. Tyler, As Iraqis'Disaffection Grows, U.S. Offers Them
a GreaterPoliticalRole, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at A8.
146. See, e.g., Pamela Constable, Kurds Adapt to a New Order in Iraq, WASH. POST., Aug. 12,
2003, at A8 (discussing the nature of the relationship between the predominantly Arab peoples of
Iraq and the ethnic Kurdish minority).
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of a new constitution. 147 At the least, it seems as if the Northern judicial
districts that are home to this Kurdish minority will allow for some
degree of equal representation on the bench. 14
One of the greatest obstacles to reestablishing a functioning
judiciary will be the anger of Iraq's Sunni minority who is now faced
with a government in which even a semblance of equal representation
will strip them of the privileges they enjoyed under the mamluk warrior
class, the Ottomans, the British, and eventually Hussein's Baath party as
well. 149 Given that the country is predominantly Shi'ite, it stands to
reason that the newly established judiciary should also be predominantly
Shi'ite. Yet this raises both the question of the Shi'ite population's
ignorance of legal practice, and that of the Sunni population questioning
the legitimacy of a judiciary that might be seen as religiously biased,
retaliatory, and possibly a tool of the imperialist United States. A Shi'ite
member of the Governing Council, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, amidst the
talks of transferring power to a representative government in December
50
2003, said that "[t]he Shia felt persecuted under the former regime.'
He went on to say that, simply put, "[tihe Kurds and the Sunni are afraid
of a Shiite government."' 151 As might be expected, "Senior members of
the Saddam regime are likely to be particularly in danger of retribution.
Prominent families and tribes who have lost relatives will exact revenge
on officials of the former regime... when they can be found.' ' 2 This
unavoidable consequence of decades of violence will make
consideration of former Baath party members as a possible solution to
the dearth of judges in the country particularly troublesome. Former
Baathists will be presumed corrupt and any Shi'ite who earns a position

147. See Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, Guerillas Posing More Danger, Says U.S.
Commanderfor Iraq, N.Y, TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003, at Al. The two major points of debate are the
question of Kurdish autonomy and that of whether "Iraq will be a secular state, an Islamic one or
something in between." Id. at A15.
148. The specific problems faced by Iraq's Kurdish population are beyond the scope of this
Note and will not be addressed in detail. Suffice it to say for our purposes that they too have been
deprived of the opportunity to participate in the operation of the nation's judiciary, and their ranks
will suffer from many of the same difficulties that will beset the nation's Shiite population.
149. See Andrews & Tyler, supra note 145 ("ITIhe greatest threat to Americans in Iraq will
come not from the Shiites, despite their close ties to Iran, but from disaffected Sunnis who have lost
the relatively privileged position they enjoyed under Saddam Hussein.").
150. Joel Brinkley, Iraqi Council Agrees on NationalElections, Setting Up Panel toExamine
Feasibility,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at A11.
151.
152.

Id.
DOBBINS, supra note 8, at 173.
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on the bench will be presumed vindictive and vengeful, or at the very
least, inexperienced.
2. The Effect of De-Baathification on Iraq's Judiciary
The first Order issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority was
on the topic of "De-Baathification of Iraqi Society., 15 3 The stated
purpose of the De-Baathification Order is as follows: "By this means,
the Coalition Provisional Authority will ensure that representative
government in Iraq is not threatened by Baathist elements returning to
power and that those in positions of authority in the future are acceptable
to the people of Iraq."' 154 In addition to making it illegal to publicly
display Mr. Hussein's visage and providing rewards for information that
leads to the capture of more senior party members, the Order defines a
multi-tiered classification of former party members, that mirrors the
party's own organization structure.15 5 Generally speaking, "Senior Party
Members" are "removed from their positions and banned from future
employment in the public sector." 156 The CPA conducted interviews of
any suspected former low-ranking Baathists in an effort to determine
whether they may be fit for public service in the future. 157 Iraq's
Governing Council released their own set of guidelines on the deBaathification procedure in January of 2004.158 The primary difference
between the guidelines put in place by the CPA and those released by
the Governing Council is that the latter has allowed for "an elaborate
appeals process that will allow some of those in the fourth-highest
leadership echelon to contest their dismissals if they did not commit any
in the party was mainly on the basis of
crimes and if their advancement
159
professional achievement."
The discovery of 2.5 million pages of party records found in Iraq
has also shed a great deal of light on the nature of the organization as
well as the actions and political propensities of various party

153.
party).
154.

Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq), Ord. I (May 16, 2003) (disestablishing the Baath
Id.

155. See id.
156. Id.
157.

See id.

158. Tom Hundley & Stephen Franklin, Baathist Purge Formalized; Council Reveals
Guidelines on Ex-partyLeaders, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2004, at 7.

159. Id.
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members.1 60 Amidst these documents was a massive list of all of the
high school seniors in Iraq with a chart detailing their stance towards ten
issues of political and social importance.16t This cache of information,
and any others like it, might prove helpful in determining what Iraqis
that were not party members might be the most suitable for civil service.
There is a great deal of debate within Iraq over whether all former party
members should be excluded from public service or just the most highranking members. 162 The custodian of these documents has stated his
hope that "the membership records among his documents will help the
51163
new government decide who among them were the most pernicious.
The major concern over this procedure with regard to the judiciary
is that all of the judges in Iraq were required to be Baath Party
members.' 64 While this de-Baathification procedure is certainly
necessary, it is likely that it will also weed out many of the "[t]housands
of educated Iraqis [who] joined the party because they had little choice if
they wanted to advance in their professions.., many of [whom] possess
' 65
the technical and administrative skills needed to rebuild the country."
The de-Nazification process in post-WWII Germany created many of the
same difficulties. 66 It bears noting that many Germans wanted to allow
ex-Nazis to participate in the civil administration of the country because
they recognized that those Nazi-party members who were members by
convenience might nevertheless be crucial to the reconstruction
process. 167 While it may be too soon to assess to what extent, if any,
these de-Baathification policies might be loosened to allow the nation's
judiciary to be rebuilt, it is crucial to be attentive to the effect that these
policies will have on the existing pool of potential Iraqi jurists.
B. The Role of the United Nations
An agreement concluded in May of 2003 between the CPA and the
U.N. about the role the U.N. would play moving forward, it seemed as if
160. Joel Brinkley, A PaperTrail Follows Iraqi Merchants of Tyranny, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,
2003, at Al.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. Id
164. See, e.g., Hundley & Franklin, supra note 158.
165. Id. The article goes on to make the somewhat ominous observation that "some of the
regime's worst thugs were low-ranking members who may evade the purge." Id.
166. See, e.g., Barbara Marshall, British Democratisation Policy
RECONSTRUCTION IN POST-WAR GERMANY 199 (Ian D. Turner ed., 1989).

167.

in

Germany, in

See id
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some of the concern over specifically anti-American sentiment might be
eluded. In fact, upon hearing that the U.N. might be sending personnel to
assess whether or not direct elections are feasible, Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani put the word out to his followers that they should refrain from
protesting against the U.S. occupation.168 At least in this one case, the
169
promise of the U.N. return has proven helpful to the occupying forces.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 created the office
of U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General. One of the
primary responsibilities of this Special Representative is to promote
"legal and judicial reform. 1 70 The man originally chosen to fill this
position, Sergio Vieira de Mello, pledged full support for judicial
reforms in Iraq, but stated that the process must be led by Iraqi nationals.
"What we have learned in the United Nations is that such processes must
be led by nationals. We must never come with our own models. We can
share them with you," he said during his first meeting with a group of
Iraqi judges and lawyers. 171 Mr. de Mello brought with him tremendous
experience,1 72 and his death has undoubtedly left a gap in the U.N.'s
capacity to successfully contribute to judicial reconstruction. Similarly,
his death at the hands of a bombing attack on the of the U.N.'s Baghdad
compound on August 19th and the subsequent bombing of the
compound on September 22nd prompted a complete exodus from Iraq of
all International U.N. personnel. 173 The man who was serving as de
Mello's replacement in the position of acting Special Representative for
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in Iraq resigned in early November
of 2003 over security concerns. 174 The U.N.'s departure, and that of
numerous other aid agencies, such as the Red Cross, is indicative of the
immediate need to reestablish basic security in Iraq. There is no question
that the U.N. can offer tremendous resources, both in terms of financial
168. Edward Wong, Iraq's Path Hinges on Words of Enigmatic Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2004, at 12.
169. See generally Michael J. Matheson, UnitedNations Governance of Postconflict Societies,
95 AM. J. INT'L L. 76 (Jan. 2001) (providing a historical perspective on U.N. involvement in postconflict reconstruction).
170. John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, Security Council Pledges Aid from U.N., Coalition and
World Community in Rebuilding Infrastructure and Government of Iraq, 9 INT'L L. UPDATE 78

(May 2003) (discussing the "seven broad mandates" of UNSCR 1483).
171. UN Envoy Vows Full Supportfor Judicial Reforms in Iraq, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
June 25, 2003.

172. Specifically in Kosovo in June 1999 and East Timor in May 2002. See id.
173. Thalif Deen, Iraq: Relief Agencies Wary of Returning, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 14,
2003.
174.

See id.
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and intellectual capital, to the process of reconstructing the judiciary.
However, it seems as if the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi
Governing Council must first establish fundamental law and order
before any discussion of what the U.N. might do in the future is
appropriate.
Suffice it to say at this point that the U.N.'s absence in the early
phase of the reconstruction was lamentable, especially given the fact that
the void they left in terms of supporting the Iraqi people has been filled
by organizations such as Hezbollah, 175 and individuals such as Muqtada
al-Sadr, 176 both of whom are active in stirring the socio-political waters
in post-Saddam Iraq.

III. SURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLES
A.

Structure of the Judiciary

Given the inherent complexity in such situations, it is important to
recognize that, while there may be no clear blueprint for judicial reform
in the post-conflict setting, successful efforts in this area may be looked
to for guidance. 177 An examination of current judicial structures among
Middle Eastern countries reveals that the Kuwaiti model may be the
best-suited to handle the needs of the nascent Iraqi government as well
as the people, in that the latter will undoubtedly have widely varying
opinions on how certain matters are to be adjudicated given the religious
diversity in the country. If the new Iraqi judiciary can quell the Iraqi
peoples' fears that they will be forced to abide by the laws of other
175. The Shiite Islamic group Hezbollah is well-known for having "some of the most
dangerous [terrorist] operatives in the world." James Risen, Hezbollah, in Iraq, Refrains From
Attacks on Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2003, at A10. Needless to say, Hezbollah is not a
suitable replacement for the United Nations. However, a former American official, who was
familiar with the intelligence reports on Hezbollah's presence in Iraq, cited the group's close ties to
Tehran, and suggested "sending Hezbollah to Iraq is about Iran's desire for us to take them
seriously, both in terms of their interests in Iraq and their broader concerns in the Middle East." He
concluded by suggesting that Iran wants "a dialogue with us, and they are signaling they can help us
or hurt us." Id.
176. Muqtada al-Sadr is a radical Shiite cleric, whose militia has been actively fighting both
Coalition forces and Iraqi Security forces in certain portions of Baghdad as well as Najaf. See, e.g.,
Raid Fails to Seize al-Sadr, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004, at A7.
177. Michael G. Kamavas, Creating the Legal Framework of the Brcko District of Bosnia and
Herzegovina: A Model for the Region and Other Posiconflict Countries, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. I11,
111-12 (2003) ("While circumstances vary and analogies rarely serve as clear guides to action in
postconflict nation building, architects crafting the framework for peace are well served by being
cognizant of models that have worked reasonably well elsewhere.").
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religious sects, then it will have taken an enormous step toward
legitimacy. The shari'a is predominantly applied to personal status
issues. 178 That in mind, numerous Islamic States have established
separate shari'a courts to hear such issues. 179 On the other hand, Kuwait
has a civil court system that has specific sections designed to hear
personal status cases.180 "For Muslims, the courts rule on the basis of
codified Sunni law or Shi'i (ja far) law depending on the litigants. NonMuslims are governed by their own laws.' 8'1 This allows such cases,
religiously-charged as they may be, to remain under the broader
umbrella (and appellate control) of the nation's judiciary as a whole. The
inherent complexity of such a system will be a deterrent to those
considering how to handle personal status issues in Iraq, but it could be
the only possible way to appease the various religious and ethnic subgroups within Iraq.
A similar system was in place in Iraq prior to the Coalition invasion
but it was largely dysfunctional, along with the rest of the judiciary,
given the overwhelming influence of Saddam Hussein's Revolutionary
Court and Special Courts.18 2 Iraq had a sub-system of Religious Courts
that would apply shari'a law to personal status issues for Muslims,
while allowing such matters to be dealt with in the Civil Court of First
Instance for non-Muslims. 83 Given that there ought to be at least a
memory of such a system, one in which both the Sunnis and Shiites can
have their own courts, it seems possible that it might be reestablished.
Iraq currently has twelve judicial districts. 8 4 One concern is that
these judicial districts may have been established according to Saddam
Hussein's policy of minimizing the popular strength of the Kurds in the
north of the country. There is little to no information available on how
these judicial districts were established, nor does there appear to be any
movement to reconsider their boundaries.

178.

See COULSON, supra note 14, at 155.

179. See generally BROWN, supra note 97 (providing a detailed analysis of the judicial
structures among thirteen Arab nations other than Iraq).
180. See id. at 23.
181.
182.

Id.
SPECIAL REPORT 104, supra note 83, at 6 ("While the civilian courts hear cases and render

verdicts, they are powerless to resist political direction from the government and interference from
the security services. They also have suffered from the corruption that has infected the rest of Iraq's
institutions following the first Gulf War.").
183. Id.
184. Douglas Birch, N.J. Judge Tackles a Tough Docket in Iraq; Army Reservist to Reform a
Battered Justice System, BALT. SUN, July 20, 2003, at IA.
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B. Fillingthe Bench
Given the relatively small number of judges from which a new
judiciary can be selected,18 5 it will be a challenge to fill the bench. One
possible solution may be to contract judges in from other Arab countries,
a technique that has been successfully employed by Kuwait. In Kuwait,
the contracts are orchestrated through the Ministry of Justice and there is
a distribution of power as to the contracts' validity in that the Ministry of
agreements without the approval of the
Justice can not terminate 18these
6
Council.
Judicial
Supreme
One consideration that will need to be addressed before the process
of reestablishing the judiciary is completely underway is that of
compensation for judges. While addressing a group of Arab jurists at the
Arab Judicial Forum, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
stated that "a necessary component for a good judicial system is to be
sure that the judges are adequately paid so that they have a decent
standard of living as a judge and we hope would be less tempted to
engage in unlawful behavior."'1 87 This is likely to be especially true in
post-war Iraq given the tradition of corruption within the civil service
and the government as a whole. A strong compensation structure will
likely be required in order to counteract the potentially disruptive effects
of various militant Islamic and insurgent factions within the country's
population. The CPA took a step in the right direction in January of
2004 when it issued an order providing for a pension to be paid to the
families of judges and prosecutors who are killed while in office.' 8 8 The
CPA is also implementing a nation-wide pay schedule for those who
work as civil servants, including judges, attorneys and courthouse
employees.' 89 By the fall of 2003, most of these civil servants were
receiving payment under this schedule, a welcome change considering
that nearly all had gone without pay from the day of the Coalition

185.

Estimates as to the number ofjudges in Iraq at the point when Saddam's regime collapsed

range from 700 to 860. Compare Brian MacQuarrie, Rebuilding Iraq/The Court System; Rule of
Law Begins to Take Hold in the Judiciary, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 29, 2003, at A26 (700 judges),
with US-Led Coalition Launches Sweeping Judicial Reforms in Iraq, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June
18,2003 (860judges).
186. BROWN, supra note 97, at 24.

187.

Press Release, United States Dept. of State, O'Connor Stresses Importance of Judicial

Training, Ethical Standards (Sept. 17, 2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Feb/02433891 .html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).

188.

Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq), Ord. 52 (Jan. 6, 2004).

189.

McGovern, supra note 95, at 36.
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invasion. 190 Military observers have reported that judges are complaining
that their salary under this plan is too low.' 9 ' However, they also
reported that "[t]hey work from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. six days per week,
courthouse employees were milling
[during which time] most judges and
' 92
about and not too busy working."'
1. Training New Judges
Following the Arab Judicial Forum held in Bahrain in September of
2003, Justice O'Connor stated that, in the context of Arab judicial
reform, "judicial training is key ... to making the system work."' 93 This
statement was made with the caveat that this is especially true in civil
law systems where judges are trained separately from lawyers.194 Many
of the judicial structures within the Arab world are based upon the
Egyptian system, which was based upon the French civil law system. 95
Even the United States' own common law system supports a robust
continuing legal education system for members of the bar. Therefore, the
importance of a structured judicial training mechanism in post-war Iraq
will be of paramount importance regardless of whether the new
Constitutional framework establishes a civil law or common law system.
There is little information on what is being done in this arena at this
point. However, some news items indicate that the United States
Military is using some of their Judge Advocate General Corps to train
new Iraqi judges and attorneys. 196 During the judicial reform efforts in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1999, an intensive three-week training
program was established for the newly appointed members of the
judiciary. 197 Iraq should establish a similar program at a minimum. A
longer term program for judicial training must also be established.
Several countries and NGOs have offered assistance in terms of
training security forces. 198 To date, however, few nations or
organizations have made formal offers to assist in the training of judges.

190.

See id.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See id.
Id
Press Release, United States Dept. of State, supra note 187.
See id.
See id. See generally BROWN, supra note 97.
Tom McCann, Chicago Area's Military Lawyers Lay Down the Law in Iraq, CHICAGO

LAWYER, Feb. 2004.

197.

Kamavas, supra note 177, at 122.

198.

See, e.g., Jordan Translates Its Positions Toward Iraq on the Field, Not Mere Slogans,

AMMAN AL-RA'Y (Jordan) Oct. 1, 2003.
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Egypt's National Center for Judicial Studies in Cairo is recognized as
99
one of the foremost judicial training facilities in the Middle East.'
Other Arab countries have sent judges to the Center for training in the
past.2 °° Perhaps its resources might be brought to bear on the process.
While there seems to be little news of nation's offering their assistance
on this admittedly focused issue, some other groups have recently
stepped up and offered to lend some assistance. For example, the
American Bar Association sent a letter to President Bush in January
2004 offering its services to help rebuild the judiciary.20 1 The offer was
forwarded from the White House to the Coalition Provisional Authority
in Baghdad. A spokesperson for the CPA was "unsure" whether the offer
would be accepted.20 2
2. Judicial Selection
During the process of judicial reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina in
1999, the Brcko Law Revision Commission (BLRC), whose
responsibility it was to rebuild a unified judiciary, looked to the process
of judicial selection that took place during the reunification of Germany
after the fall of the Berlin Wall.20 3 While the overall success of the
BLRC's efforts has yet to be determined, several of the strategies upon
which they relied will likely be helpful in post-war Iraq. First, the BLRC
"determined that all judicial member and court staff would need to
reapply and compete for positions in the new judiciary.,, 204 During this
re-interviewing process, the BLRC had clearly established guidelines as
to who would constitute a qualified candidate: "The overall emphasis
irrespective of one's ethnic background, gender, or
was on competence,
205
origin.,,
of
place
This sort of approach would be well applied in Iraq. Realistically,
the complete de-Baathification of the judiciary will be nearly impossible.
That in mind, the new Iraqi judiciary must at least be composed of
members with proven competence as legal practitioners and judicial
decision-makers. By establishing a probationary period during which a
judicial review committee of sorts could oversee the implementation of
199. BROWN, supra note 97, at 18.
200. See id.
201.

See Brian Lazenby, American Bar Association Offers to Rebuild Iraq, CHATTANOOGA

TIMES FREE PRESS (Tenn.), Jan. 16, 2004, at B2.
202. Id.
203. Karnavas, supra note 177, at 122.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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the new legal system, any potentially biased or otherwise unqualified
judges who make it through this first screening process could be weeded
out. 20 6 The judiciary must first function before it can function perfectly.

The process began shortly after the Coalition Invasion. Major
General Donald F. Campbell, the senior U.S. advisor to the Iraqi
judiciary, supervised an "aggressive evaluation process" for members of
the new judiciary. 20 7 Pursuant to the CPA's order on de-baathification,
high-ranking members of Saddam's Baath party were eliminated from
the judiciary. This de-Baathification of the judiciary is especially
troublesome because Baath party membership was a prerequisite to legal
education and judicial appointment under Saddam Hussein. 208 This
process will probably reduce the already dauntingly small number of
judges currently within Iraq to fill these positions. In August of 2003,
only 700 judges were being put through this evaluation process in hopes
of determining their "fitness for the bench in a democratic society. ' 20 9
This number indicates that, before a country-wide judiciary can be
firmly established, new judges must be added from either within the
country's broader legal community, from the population of Iraqi exiles,
or possibly from the judiciaries of neighboring Arab states.
A specially formed Judicial Review Committee is in charge of the
vetting process, whose end has been described as the elimination of "the
bad elements who played an adverse role during the era of the ousted
regime.,, 2 This committee has been eliminating judges based on their
participation in the special courts used by Saddam's regime. 2 " One
potential concern here is that many of the judges who participated in
these special courts did so under strict orders from Saddam himself or
one of the branches of his security services. Therefore, it would seem
that mere participation in such a court ought not to preclude a judge
from further service. It bears noting that former Baath Party memberJudges have not been categorically excluded from the bench. In some
areas of Iraq, the only judges remaining on the bench are former Baath

206. See, e.g., id. at 122 (discussing the one-year probationary period for which new judges
were appointed by the BLRC).
207. MacQuarrie, supranote 185.
208. Ann Scott Tyson, IraqiJustice System Starts to Mend, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 1,
2003, at 06.
209. MacQuarrie, supranote 185.
210. Iraq: Judicial Review Committee Dismisses 66 Judges, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, Nov. 5,

2003.
211.

Id.
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Party members.2" 2 While this raises the specter of a stymied
democratization process, it is likely the only means through which a
fully-staffed, and adequately trained, judiciary may be established.
Concern over the exclusion of former Baathists from various
components of the government's infrastructure has arisen from sources
as diverse as senior American military personnel and Iraq's Prime
Minister Ayad Allawi.2 13 So long as a process through which corrupt
Baathists might be removed from power is in place, the notion of
permitting former Baathists to serve their country should not be
completely cast aside. Admittedly, this is no small task. There is already
concern that Prime Minister Allawi's ties to the Baath party, and his
efforts to disband the commission in charge of the de-Baathification
"the foundation for an effective reconstitution of
process, have created
2 14
the Baath party.
C.

THE PLACE OF ISLAM IN IRAQ'S SUBSTANTIVE LAW

In order to appease the Iraqi people, those international jurists and
scholars who are involved with this process must do so with an as-yetunheard-of sensitivity to the inescapable need to establish a system of
law that satisfies the unique needs of Iraq's overwhelming Muslim
majority. That said, it is important for scholars of Western,
predominantly secular, law to learn that a democracy built upon an, atleast-partially, Islamic judiciary is not only feasible but absolutely
necessary given the current socio-political conditions in Iraq and the
Middle East. In order for the newly reformed judiciary to have the
requisite amount of legitimacy, it will have to be at least partially
Islamic in nature. To what degree this turns out to be the case will be a
function of the nature of the Constitutional framework that is established
(assuming it has not been established by the time of publication).
An Iraqi scientist living in Canada has published an article
suggesting a referendum on several issues that must be clarified before

212. See Tyson, supra note 208 ("Perhaps more important, with many prewar Baath Party
judges ...firmly in place, it remains unclear how effectively such [legal] reforms will be
implemented. In Salahaddin Province, for example, all 52 prewar judges-all of whom were
members of the now banned Baath Party-remain in their jobs.")
213. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, U.S. Generals FaultBan on Hussein's Party, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
Edward Wong & Erik Eckholm, Allawi Presses Effort to Bring Back Baathists, N.Y.
2004, at A 1l.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at A12. It should be noted that Dr. Allawi is a former Baathist himself,
although one "who fell out of favor with Saddam Hussein" prior to the Coalition invasion. Id.
214. See Wong & Eckholm, supra note 208.
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the drafting of a constitution. 1 5 The first, and apparently most important,
that he suggests is a referendum on the theme of Islam and constitution.
The three options he proposes are as follows: "[1] Islam is the only
source of constitution, legislature, judicial and executive, . . [2] Islam is
the main, but not only, source of constitution, legislature, judicial and
executive, [and 3]... Islam is one of the sources of constitution,
legislature, judicial and executive." 21 6 The relevance of this is that, at
least in the eyes of one Iraqi, it is simply not an option for a completely
secular, non-Islamic government to take the place of Saddam Hussein's
Baath party. The sooner that those in charge of overseeing this judicial
reformation process accept this as at least a possibility, the sooner they
can get started on building a legitimate judiciary.
Unfortunately, it seems as if the United States is convinced that an
Islamic judiciary as a component of an Islamic state is out of the
question. When asked whether he foresaw Iraq developing as an Islamic
State, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated simply, "That won't
happen., 217 It is important for Mr. Rumsfeld and everyone else who will
have a hand in this redevelopment process to know that an "Islamic
State" need not turn out to be a hotbed for terrorism and human rights
violations. Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl has stated that, "[a] dual
commitment of Islamic Law and democracy is possible, but only if
Muslims understand Islamic law to reinforce the same commitments
made by democracy to individual human rights and dignities., ," 8 The
decision as to what role Islam will play in the new Iraqi state and its
judiciary must ultimately be made by the Iraqi people.
CONCLUSION

Clement Attlee's observation on the democratization process in
post-WWII Germany may serve as a helpful guideline for those involved
in this project: "It was an illusion to imagine that there was a normal
Germany to which one could revert. There has been no normal Germany
for fifty years or more, except one governed by a centralized and
215. Munthir A1-Lami, Editorial, Commentary: Required Immediately in Iraq: Referendum
Before Constitution!, Iraq Occupation Watch Center, at http://www.occupationwatch.org/
article.php?id=407 (Aug. 11, 2003). As of December 2003, such a referendum was scheduled to
occur some time after the direct election of participants to a constitutional convention, targeted to
occur prior to March 15, 2005. See Tse, supra note 6, at A11.
216. Id.
217. Linda S. Heard, Editorial, Broken Promises, ShatteredHope, GULF NEWS, May 20, 2003.
218. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebuilding the Law in Iraq, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 21, 2002, at 12.
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militaristic machine., 2 9 Something very similar might be said about
Iraq. Instead of a mere fifty years, however, one must look past the days
of the Ottoman empire for any sort of normalcy, and even then will find
a legal order that is totally unsuited to the nation's contemporary needs.
Iraq in its present state provides the world with an opportunity to create
a functioning Islamic Democracy, one in which terrorism is not the most
attractive option for the young and discontented, one that the peoples of
neighboring states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia 220 can look to for
guidance.
With that in mind, it is of absolutely paramount importance that
each piece of the puzzle fit together snugly. It will do little good to
establish a robust police force and security apparatus unless these
obstacles to judicial reform are overcome. Economic and industrial
reconstruction cannot proceed without a strong, independent, and
professional judiciary to interpret and enforce the nation's legal canon.
While this Note has discussed the substantial impediments to the
process, there are also great advantages provided by Iraq itself. There is
a strong judicial infrastructure, tainted though it may be. Despite its
defunct status in recent decades, Iraq also possesses a sophisticated body
of law that may transfer nicely into the able hands of a new judiciary.
Come what may, this task is equally unparalleled in both its scope and
the level of sensitivity to the past that it will require.
The Coalition of the Willing set out to create a unified democracy
in Iraq. The ultimate result of this nation-building effort will likely not
be apparent for years to come. The violence that is shredding the country
at this moment is the result of a sinister coincidence of efforts by radical
elements of the Shi'ite majority and Saddam-loyalist Sunnis who have
kept the former under such strict control for centuries. The last time
Shi'a and Sunni fought against a common foe was in 1920, when a
219. Marshall, supra note 166, at 190.
220. There is some evidence that the Saudi Shi'a population is already becoming invigorated
by developments in Iraq. For example, the royal family has announced that they will be holding the
first local council elections in the country's history due to increased "pressure to institute
democratic reforms." Saudi Arabia Announces First Local Council Elections, but No Date, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2003, at A3. This is precisely the sort of effect that analysts hope the
democratization of Iraq will have on its neighbors. See, e.g., GRAHAM E. FULLER, UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE, ISLAMIST POLITICS IN IRAQ AFTER SADDAM HUSSEIN 7 (Aug. 2003) ("Since

the fall of Saddam Hussein and the emergence of Shiite political forces in Iraq, the Saudi Shia have
themselves become emboldened to call for greater cultural rights within the Saudi system."). See
also Kenneth M. Pollack, Editorial, Saudi Arabia's Big Leap, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2003, at A29
("[M]oreso than even the pluralist maelstrom in Iraq, moves toward democratization in Saudi
Arabia could have ripples throughout the Middle East.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss1/8

34

Roberts: Socio-Religious Obstacles to Judicial Reconstruction in Post-Sadd

2004]

JUDICIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ

massive armed revolt broke out against the British who occupied the
country under Mandate. 221 The British failed to take a proper accounting
of the socio-religious divide in Iraq and, as a result, established a
government that created the environment in which a man like Saddam
Hussein could take power. Those persons in charge of rebuilding Iraq's
judiciary must be mindful of the errors made while Iraq was under
British control. A functioning, independent judiciary, that enjoys the
confidence of the nation's population, is the bedrock upon which
democracy may be established. Failure to purge the corrupt Baathists
from the bench will place a massive impediment in the way of
democratic reform. At the same time, blind adherence to a deBaathification policy that removes those Baathists who were party
members by convenience will strip Iraq's nascent judiciary of a great
deal of its intellectual and experiential capital. This is an exceptionally
complicated task, and is made moreso given the potential ramifications
of a failed democratization effort in this age of economic globalization
and terrorism. While the stakes are high and the end result remains to be
seen, one thing is certain: "Law alone saves a society from being rent by
222
internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power however disguised.
Perhaps the victors of the Iraqi election, and the insurgents who are
working so hard to disrupt it, will take the time to read this Note so that
they might be reminded that justice is not above the law.
Stanley A. Roberts*

221. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
222. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Hofstra University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Nora V. Demleitner for her invaluable guidance throughout the Note writing process. I would also
like to express my deepest gratitude to my parents, William Lee and Gale Abbott Roberts, and
siblings, Bill, Allen, and Elizabeth. Without their collective influence and support, none of my life's
accomplishments would have come to pass.
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